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I. INTRODUCTION
Divorce is at epidemic proportions. In 1993, there were 1.2 million divorces, about one-half of which involved at least one minor
child, according to the National Center for Health Statistics.1 In
1993, "[tlwenty-nine percent of all minor children were living in a
single parent home, a total of 17.3 million children. Each year an
additional 1 million children experience the divorce or separation of
their biological parents."2 Scholars and statisticians project that forty
percent of children born during a marriage will experience the divorce of their parents.3
Upon a divorce, parents and children must reorganize their
lives. A custodian for the children must be chosen, visitation for the
non-custodial spouse must be arranged, and child support must be
determined. We need precise and workable standards to help divorcing parties and the courts make these arrangements.
Custody decision-making has been historically characterized by
rule-based, gender-specific outcomes. For centuries, fathers received
custody of their children after a divorce. "The patriarch's right to

1. Stephen J. Bahr, et al., Trends In Child Custody Awards: Has The Removal Of Maternal Preference Made A Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 247 (1994).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 247-48.
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custody and control over his minor children was near absolute as the
nineteenth century opened and was the uniform rule in American
jurisdictions."' Then, during the late 1800s and early 1900s, custody
decision-making shifted with the rise of the cult of womanhood. As
one commentator noted, "[bly the end of the nineteenth century ...
the patriarch's right was replaced by a maternal preference at divorce: a presumption that children of tender years were best off in
the custody of their mother."5 Thus, prior to 1970, the restructuring
of the divorced family was facilitated by the maternal preference mothers would get custody of their children, fathers would visit and
pay child support.
Around 1970, gender-based decision-making began to disappear.6 The maternal preference was effectively challenged as unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Within a decade nearly all
jurisdictions turned their attention to the child, rather than to the
gender of the parent.7 The maternal preference was replaced by the
"best interests of the child" standard. Under the ostensibly neutral
best interests standard, the judge could consider a series of factors to
determine the child's custodians. Factors typically include the child's
wishes, the child's attachment to school and her environment, the
past care taking practices of each parent, the significance of the
child's interaction and inter-relationship with each parent, siblings,
with other relatives, and the physical and mental health of all persons involved in the potential custody arrangement.
The best interests standard was adopted in part to provide a
gender neutral standard to evaluate which parent should get custody
after a divorce.8 Therefore, "[cihild custody would be decided only by
reference to what is best for the individual child, and not by the
gender of the parents. Because every family is different, decisions
would be made on a case-by-case basis to ensure that each child was
placed with the best custodian."9 Utilizing the best interests standard, family law courts sought to achieve individualized justice in
every case.
Within the last decade, the predominant best interests standard
has come under increasing attack by legal commentators as being
indeterminate and unduly influenced by the courts' unbridled discre-

4.

Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo and Child Custody, 1 S.

CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 168 (1992).
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 169.
8.
9.

Id. at 172.
Id.
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tion and bias. In response, a few alternative custody standards have
emerged.
This article will examine how a judge's ethical framework can
influence the outcome of a custody award, even where the same
"child-centered" standard is ostensibly being used. This article uses
three cases from the Supreme Court of Nebraska to demonstrate that
the "best interests of the child" standard can be used: 1) to award a
parent custody because parents have near absolute rights (an example of rule deontology); 2) to deny a parent custody because the parent is unfit (an example of rule utilitarianism); or 3) to deny a parent
custody because the child's life needs stability (an example of act
utilitarianism).
The three case illustrations come from different time periods.
Thus, they show how Nebraska's understanding and interpretation of
the best interest of the child standard has changed over the years.
Equally, they suggest that any court using the best interest standard
may vary the interpretation of the standard to fit an ethical posture
or belief system, if not checked by more specific decision-making
guidelines.
Part II of this article briefly looks at some ethical options which
would facilitate determinate custody decision-making. Finally, part
III of this article explores the evolution of the primary caretaker
standard as a reaction to the indeterminacy of the best interests
standard and as an attempt to limit judicial discretion.
II. LIMITATIONS AND BARRIERS TO UTILIZING THE BEST
INTERESTS STANDARD IN ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING
A. Competing Ethical Frameworks Permitted By the Best Interests
Standard
The evolution of custody decision-making can be seen as a progression from rule deontology to rule utilitarianism to act utilitarianism. ° Custody law began with the natural law view that father was

10.

To simply define these ethical stances and their differences:
1) Deontologists claim that certain actions and results are inherently right
or good, or right or good as a matter of principle. WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS
16-17 (2d ed. 1973). Rule deontology operates from these principles.
2) A second ethical philosophy, teleology, proposes that actions and results
should be favored not because they are intrinsically good, but rather because they
promote the better good. The moral value of an action is a function of its consequences. Teleologists advocate actions which are good because of their consequences. Id. at 14-15.
Utilitarianism,which holds that an action is right if it promotes the maxi-
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the pre-ordained and only legal custodian of children.1" It then
moved from this deontological perspective to a utilitarian ranking
based on which parent offered the most value to society as custodian.
Rule utilitarianism is reflected in the tender years presumption
which dominated the twentieth century until 1970.12 Finally, custody law moved predominantly to act utilitarianism when it adopted a
best interest standard dependant on the weighing of factors - for example, the quality of the child's environment; the child's relationship
with each parent and siblings; the child's wishes, adjustment to
school, etc. - which could be summed up to find the custodian who
offered the greatest good for the child.13
Arguably, the best interests standard promotes a utilitarian
resolution to a custody problem. Because there are four competing
stakeholders in a best interests custody decision, using an act-utilitarian strategy, the interests of the father, mother, child and state
should be weighted and summed for each custody award to discover
the greatest utility to all concerned.
However, even though the best interests standard seems to propose act utilitarianism, in reality the court has favored rule utilitarianism as presenting a more simple analysis. The past seventy years
has seen the predominance of the state's and the parents' interests as
having greater utility than the child's. Although theoretically the
best interests analysis was fostered to protect a child's welfare, practically, the decision-making often ignores the child itself. With the
advent of the tender years doctrine, the natural deontological-law
presumption of the father as the primary custodian was converted to
a teleological rule of the mother providing the most utility. As courts
had uniformly awarded custody to the father prior to 1820, throughout the 1920s to the 1960s, courts uniformly gave custody to the
mother. The glimmer of a genuine "best interests" determination that

mum good for everyone, or at least the greatest number, is a form of teleology. Id.
at 37-38.
Rule utilitarianism formulates the rules which tend to produce the greatest
good. Id. at 39.
Act utilitarianism focuses on choosing the acts which tend to produce the
greatest good without any guidance of rules. Id. at 35-36.
11. Note, Maurice K. C. Wilcox, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in
Divorce Custody Proceedings, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 920 (1976).
12. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427, 433 (1990).
13. See generally, David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for
Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1984).
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was seen between 1820 and 1920 yielded to an overriding presumption of "Mom" as best parent. Although "best interests" terminology
was frequently used, the monotony of custody decisions showed that
it had little real meaning and impact.
In the last twenty years, most jurisdictions have moved away
from the presumption that Mom is the better custodian. Instead, they
have focused their attention on the child's needs, the child's relationships, and the child's right to personal growth.
In reality, none of the competing ethical perspectives has been
entirely abolished. Rule deontology, rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism survive and flourish under the nebulous best interests of
the child standard. Given the discretion inherent in the standard, a
judge is often free to apply his or her own ethical standard while
reiterating the "best interests" test. Furthermore, we find that sometimes all ethical perspectives are being used, even in the same jurisdiction, to justify conflicting custody awards. When the best interests
of the child is not defined, it is up to the judge to impose her or his
own ethical framework on the decision-making.
B. Case Examples of the Influence Rule Deontology, Rule
Utilitarianism, and Act Utilitarianism Have on Best Interests
Custody Decisions
Three cases from Nebraska demonstrate how the indeterminate
best interests standard can be used to support widely different judicial decision-making and, consequently, different results. All three
cases involve a custody dispute between the child's parents and
grandparents. In each case, the issue is whether the grandparents
can be given custody of the child over the child's parents. All three
cases ostensibly use the "best interests of the child" standard. Nonetheless, all use unbridled judicial discretion to impose different ethical postures on the custody decision.
Raymond v. Cotner 4 uses rule deontology to find that a father
has an absolute right to custody of his daughter. Osterholt v.
Osterholt" uses rule utilitarianism to find that a mother can be deprived of custody where she is found unfit. Haynes v. Haynes" uses
act utilitarianism to evaluate the emotional and physical well-being
of the child and the suitability of the environments the grandparents
and parent offer.

14. 120 N.W.2d 892 (Neb. 1963), overruled by Bigley v. Tibbs, 225 N.W.2d
27, 29 (Neb. 1975).
15. 114 N.W.2d 734 (Neb. 1962).
16. 286 N.W.2d 108 (Neb. 1979).
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1. Best Interests Standard Used to Promote Rule Deontology Raymond v. Cotner
In Raymond, a father who was a stranger to his daughter because he had not seen her in the last nine years, 17 was awarded custody over the grandparents with whom the girl had resided for ten
years.18 The court mentioned that the child was well cared for, in
good health, happy with her grandparents, and did not want to leave
them.19 Further, both the father and the grandparents desired the
custody of the child, had suitable homes to care for her, and adequate
means of support.2" The court suggested that the resolution to this
custody suit involved a "determination of what is best for Lin Dee
Raymond under such circumstances."2 However, the court rejected
this balancing approach to decision-making.2 2 Instead, the court
found that the father had a natural and superior custody right to his
child. 3 The court concluded, "We think the evidence shows that
plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the custody of his child
and that he has done nothing that would sustain a finding that he
had forfeited his superior right to her custody."" It was right or
good to give the father custody simply because of the nature of the
parent-child relationship.
The dissent in Raymond objected to the deontological rule that
a father has a superior custody right. '"ebelieve that parental
rights in child custody proceedings are preferential, not absolute; and
that the rights, desires, and wishes of parents should be considered
and respected in such proceedings except where they conflict with the
welfare of the children involved." 5 The dissent suggested that although the majority claimed it was doing what was best for the girl,
moving her to a virtual stranger's home after ten years with her
grandparents, would be a severe disruption and would be emotionally

17. Raymond, 120 N.W.2d at 895 ("[The father] has not visited [his daughter] during the last 9 years, although he has resided less than 100 miles distant.
[The father] said he did not visit the child for the reason that he was requested
by [the child's mother] not to do so because she did not believe it to be in the
best interests of the child.").
18. Id. at 896.
19. Id. at 894.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 894-95.
22. See id. at 896.
23. Id. at 895.
24. Id. at 896.
25. Id. (White, C.J., dissenting).
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damaging.26 The dissent complained that the majority had used a
near absolute rule, giving parents superior rights over the child's best
interests .27
Rather, the dissent suggested a utilitarian balancing of the
child's best interests on a case-by-case basis:
[A] case involving the custody of a child, deals with a matter
of an equitable nature; [the court] is not bound by any mere
legal right of parent or guardian, but is to give his or her
claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded on human nature and generally equitable and just ....
[A]
court is in no case bound to deliver a child into the custody of
any claimant or of any person but should, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, after a careful consideration of the facts,
leave it in such custody as the welfare of the child at the time
appears to require."
The concurrence explicitly rejected the dissent's suggestion of a
utilitarian best interest analysis.29 Instead, the concurrence in Raymond used a deontological ranking of natural rights in order to agree
with the decision reached by the majority, but to offer a different
reason why custody of the child should be awarded to the father. ° A
deontological ordering requires that
an exception to a rule can only occur when it has to yield the
right of way to another rule . . . . [Riules proposed may be
ranked in a hierarchy so that they never can conflict or dispute the right of way. One might also say that the rules may
have all the necessary exceptions built into them, so that,
fully stated, they have no exceptions.3 1
Following this logic, the concurring opinion suggested that the best
interests of the child are presumptively with the parent. It finds that
"a fit, proper and suitable parent" has an "absolute right" to custody.32.
Furthermore, the concurrence argued that it was the parent, not
the state, who should properly decide what is in the child's best inter-

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 897-98.
at 897.
at 899 (Messmore, J., concurring).
at 899-900 (Messmore, J., concurring).

-31.

FRANKENA, supra note 10, at 25-26.

32.

Raymond, 120 N.W.2d at 899 (Messmore, J., concurring).

ETHICS OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

1997]

ests. 33 A utilitarian best interests analysis improperly gives state
rights priority over parental rights. The concurrence "assert[ed] that
the rights of the state, exercised by the powers of a court of equity,
are subordinate to the rights of a parent."34 To prevent the state
from usurping parental rights, the only proper interpretation of
"what is best for the child" would be to award custody to the natural
parent.3 5
2. Best Interests Standard Used to Promote Rule Utilitarianism Osterholt v. Osterholt
Similar to the ranking of deontological rules in Raymond,
Osterholt also suggests the centrality of rules. However, the rationale
for ranking the rules emanates from which rule has the greater utility and the greater possibility of promoting the general good. Rule
utilitarianism suggests that action should be guided by conformance
to moral, legal and social rules adopted for their utility.36 The two
competing utility rules in Osterholt are: 1) that "the court will always
consider the best interests of the children and will make such order
for their custody as will be for their welfare without reference to the
wishes of the parties;"37 and 2) that "the court may not deprive parents of such custody unless they are shown to be unfit to perform the
be imposed by that relationship, or they have forfeited their
duties3 to
8
right."
In Osterholt, natural parents sought to reclaim custody of their
children who had resided with the paternal grandparents for more
than two years. 9 The mother had visited them three times during
this period, bringing two different men with her during these visits,
one who was alleged to be the father of an additional sibling."0
Utilizing the first Osterholt rule, the court examined the present
surroundings of the children and their physical and mental condition. 1 It found that "[tlo take these children from an environment of
stability and security to try an experiment elsewhere does not appear
to us as being for the best interests of the children."42 Using the sec-

33.
34.

Id. at 899-900 (Messmore, J., concurring).
Id. at 900 (Messmore, J., concurring).

35. Id. (Messmore, J., concurring).
36.
37.

FRANKENA, supra note 10, at 39.
Osterholt v. Osterholt, 114 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Neb. 1962).

38.

Id.

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 736.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 736.
Id.
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ond Osterholt rule to further calculate the greatest utility, the court
found "the indifference of the mother on occasion, her willingness to
let others assume her burden, her recent moral dereliction, coupled
with the instability and irresponsibility of the father, certainly would
sustain a finding of present unfitness to perform the duties of parenthood."43 In light of these two rules, the court gave the grandparents
custody."
3. Best Interests Standard Used to Promote Act Utilitarianism Haynes v. Haynes
The last case, Haynes v. Haynes,"' takes the most discretionary
stance of judicial decision-making by using the best interests standard on a case-by-case basis.46 Act utilitarianism assesses the impact of an act in this situation on the general good without benefit of
guiding rules.47 In Haynes, a father sought custody of his children
three months after his ex-wife died. 8 Prior to her death, the mother
and children had resided with the maternal grandparents since she
and the children's father divorced."9 The court consulted the wishes
of the children, looked at the comparable home environments offered
by the parties, and concluded that the grandparents should get custody rather than the father." "[Olur examination of all the evidence
in light of the prevailing circumstances convinces us that the children
have suffered sufficient trauma for the time being and that a period
of certainty, tranquility, and security would indeed be in the
children's best interests." 1 The dissenting opinion criticized this act
utilitarian approach to best interests decision-making, complaining
that the trial court had made no finding of unfitness or forfeiture so
as to preempt the parent's custody right.52
III. PROPOSALS FOR RETURNING TO RULE VERSUS ACT
UTILITARIANISM TO ELIMINATE UNBRIDLED JUDICIAL
DISCRETION

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
286 N.W.2d 108 (Neb. 1979).
Id. at 110.
FRANKENA, supra note 10, at 35-37.
Haynes, 286 N.W.2d at 109.
Id.
Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 111 (White, J., dissenting).
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Three criticisms characterize the prevalent view of the best interest standard: 1) that the judicial discretion under the best interests standard must be limited; 2) that children must be given an increased voice in the custody decision; and 3) that the tender years
doctrine must be rejected because of the social and political climate
which demands the neutralization of the gender distinctions. In response to these criticisms, several proposals have been made to
change the way custody awards are made. The Primary Caretaker
Standard is one of those proposals.
A. Keeping the Best Interests Standard But Making It More Specific
As suggested, using the best interests standard without the
guidance of rules promotes unwanted variability in custody decisions.
This variability would be curtailed if the court would return to rule
utilitarianism, rather than act utilitarianism. More specific rules
would help guide courts' decisions and would facilitate the
predictability of a result.
A few states attempted to limit judicial discretion by codifying
specific guidelines to be adhered to in a best interests custody determination. Michigan's statute is an example:
"[Blest interests of the child" means the sum total of the
following factors to be considered, evaluated and determined
by the court:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties to give the
child love, affection and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his o'r her religion or creed, if
any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties to provide
the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial
care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in
place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of'time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home or homes.
() The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court
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considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to
facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child
relationship between the child and the other parent or the
child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence
was directed against or witnessed by the child.
(1) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant
to a particular child custody dispute.53
This long list of utility rules guides information-gathering as
well as decision-making. The Michigan standard gives the court a
more complete basis upon which to make a custody determination
and could be used as a guide by the judge to request additional information that is not being provided by the parents' counsel (i.e.,
psychologicals, expert witnesses, etc.).
B. Eliminating the Best Interests Standard in Favor of Less
Complex Utility Rules Decisions - A Recognition of Their Natural
Rights
The criticism of the best interests standard as an arbitrary standard remained in spite of these improvements in the law. Underlying this attack is again the sense that court discretion has gone too
far. Courts, using the "best interests" justification, leave the door
open for re-evaluation and reshuffling of family relationships. The
modification of a custody award is an alternative available to parents
and other interested parties. Critics find this manifestation of continued judicial discretion over families damaging to the continuity
crucial to child development.
Professor Mary Ann Glendon argues that the discretion judges
exercise under the best interests test is futile, even if the judge has
the best of intentions to reach the optimum result:
The "best interests" standard is a prime example of the futility of attempting to achieve perfect, individualized justice by
reposing discretion in a judge or other third party. Its vagueness provides maximum incentive to those who are inclined to
wrangle over custody, and it asks the judge to do what is
almost impossible: evaluate the child-caring capacities of a
mother and a father at a time when family relations are apt

53.

MIcHIGAN COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West Supp. 1996).
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to be most distorted by the stress of separation and the divorce process itself. Arguing that the idea that a judge can
determine the best interests of a child under such circumstances is a fantasy, and that efforts for legal reform should
concentrate on the effect of custody law on private ordering,..
• that almost any automatic rule would be an improvement
over the present situation.54
Three options to eliminate judicial discretion have been proposed:
1) emancipating children--that is, giving them a voice in the custody
decision; 2) using the least detrimental alternative standard; or 3)
using the Primary Caretaker Standard.
In an effort to solve the judicial discretion problem, one state,
West Virginia, has adopted the primary caretaker standard.5 5 Other
states have used the primary caretaker standard as one factor in
their best interests standard. Judge Crippen reports that, "[c]ourts
in at least sixteen states have identified and showed some favor for
the parent who had been the primary caregiver before the couple
separated.5 7 Furthermore, courts from at least seven of these states
have identified primary caretaking as a significant factor in assessing
the child's best interests.58 Courts from five states, although declaring the importance of primary caretaking, have rejected it as a presumptive determinant of custody."59
Currently, only one state, West Virginia, has singled out primary
caretaking as the sole factor indicating a child's best interests." The
presumption behind the primary caretaker standard is that children
need consistent day-to-day care, and the parent who performed this
care during the marriage should get custody.
An example of how the presumption is used to determine custody
is provided by the Oregon Court of Appeals in In re Marriageof Der-

54. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family
Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1986).
55. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
56. See, e.g., Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982);
In re Marriage of Derby, 571 P.2d 562, 564 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
57. Crippen, supra note 12, at 434 (including California, Delaware, Florida,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont and West Virginia).
58. Id. (including California, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Montana and New York).
59. Id. at 434-35. (including Iowa, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Utah and
Vermont).
60. Id. at 439.
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by,6 1 one of the earliest cases to articulate the presumption. There
the court used the primary caretaker standard to award a mother
custody of her five year old and nine year old children:
The undisputed evidence in this case was that the wife was
not merely the mother, but was also the primary parent. During the marriage she was not working and performed the
traditional and honorable role of homemaker. She cleaned the
house, cared for the children, fed the family, nursed them
when sick and spent those countless hours disciplining,
counseling and chatting with the children that every homemaker should. For some families the husband may perform
this role and be the primary parent. In other families the
parents evenly divide the role and there is no primary parent.
In this family the husband played the traditional role of
breadwinner, working eight to ten hours a day. In his offhours he dedicated much time and attention to the children,
but the lion's share of the child raising was performed by the
wife. It is undisputed that the children were happy and welladjusted and that the relationship between the wife and children was close, loving and successful. Although the same
relationship unquestionably existed to a degree with the husband, the close and successful emotional relationship between
the primary parent and the children coupled with the age of
the children dictate the continuance of that relationship. 2
As this passage demonstrates, the primary caretaker standard is
based on a rule which presumes that the greatest good for the child
will be secured if the child is placed in the custody of the parent who
has provided continuous care. Thus, it is a rule utilitarian standard.
Custody decision-making is simplified. The judge can focus on discovering which parent provides daily child care, rather than focus on all
the acts which favor the best interests of the child.
Proponents of the primary caretaker preference suggest that the
standard
benefits all interests involved in the custody decision, including the interests of the judiciary. They provide three justifications for the primary caretaker preference: protection of the
child's most vital parent-child relationship, avoidance of error,
litigation and abusive threats of litigation, and compatibility

61.
62.

571 P.2d 562 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
Id. at 564.
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with gender neutrality and the child's many interests.63
Marcia O'Kelly lists six reasons why courts have adopted a primary
caretaker presumption:
1) it promotes the continuity of the primary psychological relationship;
2) it provides an objective basis for predicting future parenting
- past care taking;
3) it deters litigants from misusing the custody issue - making
a custody request, not to gain custody, but to strengthen unrelated
interests in the negotiation process;
4) it encourages private settlement and thereby avoids the impact of protracted custody litigation and relitigation;
5) it is judicially manageable because primary caretaking can
usually be identified easily, and there should be adequate, readilyavailable information to find out which parent has this role; and
6) it permits effective appellate review of the trial court's decision: "[Did the trial judge report having considered all the relevant
factors, and64 is there some evidence in the record to support her
conclusion?"
C. Origins and Current Rationale for the Primary Caretaker
Preference in West Virginia
1. The Birth of the Primary Caretaker Presumption
Prior*to 1981, West Virginia courts awarded custody of a child of
tender years to the mother. While the majority of states abandoned
the maternal preference doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s, West Virginia maintained its gender bias. In 1978, the maternal preference
came under public attack due to a much criticized decision where the
West Virginia Supreme Court applied the maternal preference rule to
award custody to a mother' presumably found unfit by the trial
court. 5 In response, the West Virginia Legislature abolished the
maternal preference and established a best interest standard. The
relevant statute, enacted in 1980, states:
In making any such order respecting custody of minor children, there shall be no legal presumption that, as between the
natural parents, either the father or the mother should be

63. Crippen, supra note 12, at 440.
64. Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preference for the Primary
Caretaker as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REV. 481, 511-33 (1987).
65. See J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978).
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awarded custody of said children, but the court shall make an
award of custody solely for the best interest of the children
based upon the merits of each case.66
The purpose behind the amendment to section 48-2-15 "was
merely to correct the inherent unfairness of establishing a genderbased, maternal presumption which would defeat the just claims of a
father if he had, in fact, been the primary caretaker parent."67 The
Supreme Court of West Virginia, in 1981, shifted to a gender-neutral,
rule-based standard for determining the best interests of the childthe primary caretaker standard. In Garska v. McCoy,6" a mother
sought custody of her minor clhild from the child's father. The lower
court awarded the child's father custody because he was better educated, earned more money and offered a preferable social environment than the mother.69 The supreme court reversed and awarded
the *mother custody, finding that the mother was the primary caretaker.7" The court held, where the child is of tender years, "there is
a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker parent, if he or she
meets the minimum objective standard for being a fit parent."7'
The West Virginia Supreme Court justified the primary caretaker standard by scientific research which indicates that "young children, as a result of intimate interaction, form a unique bond with
their primary caretaker" which "is an essential cornerstone of a
child's sense of security and healthy emotional development."
The primary caretaker standard has been used in West Virginia
for the past thirteen years. It is the only jurisdiction to currently retain a firm custody preference for this parent. Some jurisdictions
have discussed the standard in best interests decision-making as one
of many considerations.7 3 Oregon, Ohio and Minnesota have experimented with giving the standard more weight relative to other best
interests factors.74 But none of these jurisdictions has made the
standard authoritative and determinative of a custody award as West
Virginia has.75 In essence, in spite of numerous articles advocating

66. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981) (citing W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-15 (1980)) (historical statute).
67. Id. at 361.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 359.
70. Id. at 364.
71. Id. at 362-63.
72. David M. v. Mary M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916-17 (W. Va. 1989).
73. See generally Crippen, supra note 12.
74. Crippen, supra note 12, at 436-39.
75,. Id. at 438-39.
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adoption of the presumption, West Virginia is the only jurisdiction
which recognizes that the "the best interests of the child" is coextensive with residing with the primary caretaker.76
2. Custody Decision-Making Using the Standard
Richard Neely, Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme
Court, created the primary caretaker standard in 1983 when he
wrote the majority opinion in Garska v. McCoy." Under this standard, the first step in making a custody award in West Virginia is to
determine which parent is the primary caretaker. The court created
the following criteria for determining the primary caretaker:
In establishing which natural or adoptive parent is the primary caretaker, the trial court shall determine which parent has
taken primary responsibility for, inter alia, the performance of
the following caring and nurturing duties of a parent: (1)
preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and
dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e.
transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy
scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i. e.
babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the
morning; (8) disciplining, i. e. teaching' general manners and
toilet training; (9) educating, i. e. religious, cultural, social,
etc.; and (10) teaching elementary skills, i. e., reading, writing
and arithmetic."
All ten factors are to be reviewed quickly by the court based on
the parties' testimony. There should be no need to turn to experts for
the information." Judge Neely explains: "Under West Virginia's
scheme, the question of which parent, if either, is the primary caretaker is proved with lay testimony by the parties themselves, and by
that of teachers, relatives and neighbors. Which parent does the
lion's share of the chores can be demonstrated satisfactorily in less
than an hour of the court's time in most cases." 80

76. Id. at 439.
77. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 368 (W. Va. 1981).
78. Id. at 363.
79. But cf the best interest standard which requires expert testimony as to
the child's welfare in most jurisdictions.
80. Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and
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After identifying a primary caretaker, the court must consider
whether that parent is fit before a custody award is made. "Once the
primary caretaker has been identified, the only question is whether
that parent is a 'fit parent.' In this regard, the court is not concerned
with assessing relative degrees of fitness between the two parents,
but only with whether the primary caretaker achieves a passing
grade on an objective test."81
Fitness as primary caretaker is determined by showing that the
parent: 1) provided proper nourishment and clothing to the children;
2) adequately supervised and controlled the children; 3) provided
habitable housing; 4) avoided extreme discipline, or child abuse or
other vices; and 5) refrained from immoral behavior which would
deleteriously affect the child. 2 Again lay testimony is to be used for
ease and quickness. Judge Neely comments, "Whether a primary
caretaker parent meets these criteria can be determined through
nonexpert testimony, and the criteria themselves are sufficiently
specific that they discourage frivolous disputation."" Finally, where
neither fit parent is the. primary caretaker, the court will consider
the best interest of the child on a case by case basis."
The primary caretaker standard only applies as an irrefutable
presumption to children of tender years. Children under six years old
are usually considered of tender years. 5 "When, however, we come
to those children who may be able to formulate an intelligent opinion
about their custody, our rule becomes more flexible." 6
Under section 44-10-4 of the West Virginia code, children fourteen or older have the right to declare a guardian.87 The only limitation on this right is that the named parent must be fit. "Often, as
might be expected, this means that the parent who makes the child's
life more comfortable will get custody; there is little alternative, however, since children over fourteen who are living where they do not
want to live will become unhappy and ungovernable anyway." s8
Children between age six and fourteen are dependent on their
parents, but they can usually articulate their preference as to their

the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POLY REV. 168, 181 (1984).
81. Id.
82. Moses v. Moses, 421 S.E.2d 506, 508 (W. Va. 1992).
83. Neely, supra note 80, at 181-82.
84. Garska v. Mccoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 358 (W. Va. 1981) (syllabus by the
court).
85. Neely, supra note 80, at 175.
86. Id. at 182.
87. W. VA CODE § 44-10-4 (Supp 1996).
88. Id.
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custody arrangement. The judge may ask these children their preference and consider the child's wishes as part of his or her determination.89 "When the trial judge is unsure about the wisdom of awarding the children to the primary caretaker, he or she may ask the
children for their preference and accord that preference whatever
weight he or she deems appropriate."" "The judge is not, however,
required to hear the testimony of the children, and will not usually
do so, particularly if he or she suspects bribery or undue influence."9' However, "mature" and "intelligent" children are "acceptable
experts"
who may act as "an escape valve .
in unusually hard
92
cases."
Justice Neely praised the simplicity of the primary caretaker
standard in his article, published one year after the standard was
adopted in West*Virginia:
Although this method for handling child custody may appear
overly cut-and-dried and insufficiently sensitive to the needs
of individual children, it has reduced the volume of domestic
litigation over child custody tremendously. Because litigation
per se can be the cause of serious emotional damage to children (and to adults), we consider this to be in the best interests of our state's children. Even more importantly, children
in West Virginia cannot be used as pawns in fights that are
actually about money . . . . The result is that questions of
alimony and child support are settled on their own merits. 93
However, the standard may not be as simple as Judge Neely
would suggest. Courts have struggled in several situations. For example, in determining who the primary caretaker is when parents
have shifted their roles during different periods of the child's life,
Garska suggests that the court should focus on which parent was the
primary caretaker "before the domestic strife giving rise to the proceeding began."94 Other cases have disagreed and have focused on
the entire parenting period. "A determination of who is the primary
caretaker of a child however, cannot be determined simply by reference to any one moment of time .... The determination of primary
caretaker is a task which must encompass, to some degree, an inqui-

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 924 (W. Va. 1989).
Neely, supra note 80, at 182.
David M., 385 S.E.2d at 924.
Id.
Neely, supra note 80, at 182 (emphasis in original).
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
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ry into the entirety of each child's life."95 Finally, still other courts
have refused to look to who is the primary caretaker immediately before the initiation of the divorce proceedings at all. Instead these
cases look at who was the primary caretaker before the parents' life
began to shift with the breakdown of the marriage. "Under circumstances where the status of primary-caretaker parent is lost as the
result of circumstances that are beyond the control of the parent, it is
inappropriate for a court to look to who the primary caretaker parent
was immediately before the initiation of divorce proceedings."96
Also, the length of time a parent is the primary caretaker is not
always determinative of a custody award. In Dempsey v. Dempsey,
where the mother was the primary caretaker of the children for the
first six years of the marriage, and the father was the primary
caretaker for only one year, the court said, "[c]ertainly [Mrs. Dempsey] had assumed these duties for a longer period of time, but we feel
that length of time alone is not determinative of whether the presumption should attach.""T Thus, using the primary caretaker standard may not be as easy as it looks or as it is reported by Judge
Neely.
3. Policy Reasons Behind West Virginia's Adoption of the Primary
Caretaker Standard
The Supreme Court of West Virginia adopted the primary caretaker standard: 1) to increase the predictability of and standardize
custody decisions; 2) to give parents less incentive to litigate than to
settle their custody cases; and 3) to eliminate the use of children as
bargaining chips in the process.9"
First, in the absence of a simple, reliable presumption to determine the "best interests of the child," the Garska court worried that
custody awards would become unpredictable. 9" The legislature left a
void when it overruled the maternal preference doctrine in 1980.
Absent this objective presumption, custody decisions after 1980 would
have to rest on the court's subjective assessment of each parent's
character and lifestyle and what each parent offered to the child.
Judges, who normally lack the ability to "measure minute gradations

95. Starkey v. Starkey, 408 S.E.2d 394, 398 (W. Va. 1991).
96. J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314 S.E.2d 67, 68 (W. Va. 1984) (syllabus by the court)
(holding that a mother who is not the primary caretaker right before the divorce
due to her mental illness is denied custody).
97. 306 S.E.2d 230, 231 (W. Va. 1983).
98. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361-62 (W. Va. 1981).
99. Id. at 360.
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of psychological capacity between two fit parents" would unwisely be
called upon to determine relative parental fitness with scientific
"precision."1°°
Second, Garska suggests that the unpredictability in the custody
award process, which results when the best interests test is applied,
encourages parents to engage in costly and lengthy litigation when
they should settle out of court. 10 ' In contrast, the criteria for selecting the primary caretaker are clear enough that generally parents
would be able to predict the custody award prior to litigation.0 2
This predictability would then reduce the need for litigation and
would eliminate the best interests "battle of experts." Third, Garska
worried that parents would use the unpredictable custody battle "as a
coercive weapon to affect the level of support payments and the outcome of other issues in the underlying divorce proceeding."'
Some may argue that the primary caretaker standard does not
provide "justice" however, the furtherance of justice is not one of the
articulated policies behind the primary caretaker standard. In fact,
Judge Neely admits that "[t]he primary caretaker parent rule may
strike some as unsatisfactory because it does not attempt to arrive at
precisely the correct decision in each case."'" However, he notes
that adjudication in general is imprecise.
The greatest frustration in lawmaking is that there is never a
choice between systems that work and systems that do not;
the choice is always between two systems that are both unsatisfactory in some manner. The best that can be hoped for is a
system that works better than others in most cases, and
which doesn't do too much damage in the instances where it
doesn't. By this test, the primary caretaker parent rule is a
success: Although there is some unfairness to parents who do
not take a preeminent role in caring for their children before
divorce, that unfairness is more than balanced by the effectiveness of the rule in preventing the trading of children for
money and in reducing drastically the need for complex and
damaging inquiry into family life and parental fitness.0 5
To satisfy the three policies behind the primary caretaker standard, the standard must be easy to apply and lead to certain, pre-
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dictable results. Thus, one of the main purposes behind reverting to
an objective, rule-based standard is to limit judicial discretion and
uncertainty inherent in a utilitarian based best interest analysis.
4. Judges Balance Discretionary and Rule-Bound Decision-Making
American law has continually struggled to reconcile a preference
for rule-bound, determinate decision-making with the trial court's
desire to look at an issue on a case-by-case basis and provide individualized justice in each case. "This desire for discretionary justice
reflects a tentative faith in the ability of decisionmakers to carefully
assess individual situations while avoiding undisciplined abuse of
general principles." °6
Professor Schneider explains the continuum between rules and
discretion in judicial decision-making:
[Tihere is a continuum between rules and discretion .... Toward the 'rule' end of the continuum are a series of devices
that are intended to limit decision-makers but are less directive than rules. These include the principles, policies, guidelines, presumptions, and list of factors in which family law
abounds.
At the other end of the continuum is discretion... in a
smorgasbord of forms. There is, for instance, discretion to find
facts, discretion to chose rules, discretion to interpret rules,
and discretion to apply the rules to the facts." °
Arguably, discretion is inherent in any judicial decision, even
one that is constrained by rules. Greenawalt writes that "discretion
exists if there is more than one decision that will be considered proper by those to whom the decision-maker is responsible, and whatever
external standards may be applicable either cannot be discovered by
the decision-maker or do not yield clear answers to the questions that
must be decided." °8 In any one case, a judge may be ostensibly
bound by a list of rules, but forced to chose which rules to apply or
concentrate on. Judges could decide a case by intuition as to what
seems "just" or "fair" in the situation, and then adapt the rules to fit
the result desired. The judge has the power/discretion to decide how

106.

Crippen, supra note 12, at 430-31.

107. Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in Family
Law: A Report and a Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229, 232-33 (1993).
108. Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for
the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 368 (1975).
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to apply the rule to the facts - the power to interpret the law. Discretion has its benefits.
However, discretion has its detriments as well. The "greatest
and most frequent injustice occurs at the discretion end of the scale,
where rules and principles provide little or no guidance, where emotions of deciding officers may affect what they do, where political or
other favoritism may influence decisions, and where the imperfections of human nature are often reflected in the choices made."1"
Although some judges may enjoy broad discretion, others abhor
it. Judge Crippen questions the ability of decision-makers to carefully
assess situations while avoiding "undisciplined abuse of general principles."11 Judge Neely comments on the impossibility of a judge
properly exercising discretion in deciding which parent is "better":
"The decision may hinge on the judge's memory of his or her own
parents or on his or her distrust of an expert whose eyes are averted
once too often. It is unlikely that the decision will be the kind of
individualized justice that the system purports to deliver.""' F in al ly Professor Peggy Davis writes: "As a former judge who has experienced the freedom granted
by this permissive view, I have had cause
12
to doubt its wisdom."
To avoid the dangers of unlimited discretion, judges and society
favor rules. Schneider identifies two advantages that rules have over
discretion."' First, the results under rules are more predictable and
their public nature serves the planning function of society. Planning/predictability is one of the main goals of the law.
People need to know what the law says so that they can organize their lives rationally. Rules seem likelier than discretion
to inform people what the law is and what courts will do.
Rules are, after all, publicly stated and thus are, relatively,
accessible to perspective litigants. And rules are precisely an
attempt to state in advance how cases should be decided."'
Second, rules outweigh discretion in their ability to help the
court decide similar cases according to the legal principle of stare
decisis.

109. Glendon, supra note 54, at 1181 (citations omitted).
110. Crippen, supra note 12, at 431.
111. Neely, supra note 80, at 174.
112. Peggy C. Davis, 'There Is a Book Out . . . ": An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1541 (1987).
113. Schneider, supra 107, at 237-40.
114. Id. at 237.
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Rules may serve better than discretion the goal of treating
like cases alike. If each decision-maker has discretion to decide case by case what principles to apply and how to apply
them, cases that are essentially similar are likely to be decided differently. Rules, on the other hand, work to suppress
differences of opinion among decision-makers. Furthermore,
rules serve as record-keeping devices, so that decision-makers
can more easily coordinate their rulings over time and among
themselves."'
Schneider identifies four additional advantages of rules over
discretion: 1) rules contribute to legitimacy of a decision by making
the decision more public; 2) rules allow a judge to focus on a problem
and not be distracted by irrelevant circumstances; 3) rules can enforce social norms because the public nature of rules allows individuals to plan for the consequences of their actions and to change their
behavior, if needed to avoid negative consequences; and 4) rules are
more efficient because they relieve the decision-maker from reinventing the wheel."'
The history of child custody law can be seen as a struggle between rules and discretion:
For decades we have lived with an abundantly discretionary
way of resolving child custody disputes: The best-interests-ofthe-child standard has long been understood to give judges
acres of room to roam. Yet in recent years scholar after scholar has inveighed against the discretionary scope that standard
permits judges, and jurisdiction after jurisdiction has adopted
one or another standard - the primary caretaker presumption.., for instance - intended to cabin, crib, and confine the range of judicial discretion." 7
In short, family law has recently been roiled by much
debate and many changes in which the contest between rules
and discretion features centrally. This contest is hardly resolved. Every day lawyers argue in courts and legislatures
around the country about whether a court should adopt a
discretion-limiting rule, about whether a legislature should
preempt judicial discretion by devising authoritative stan-
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Id. at 240.
Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the
Best Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215, 2249-52 (1991).
Schneider, supra note 107, at 229-30.
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dards.118
West Virginia's adoption of the primary caretaker standard can
be viewed as this jurisdiction's resolution of the rule-discretion debate.
5. Is The Primary Caretaker Standard Living Up To Its Goals?
The primary caretaker standard purports to curtail judicial
discretion, the emotional and monetary costs of litigation, and the
opportunities for using child custody as a bargaining chip, all which
result from an unpredictable individualized approach. By according
an explicit, almost absolute preference to the primary caretaker,
West Virginia law arguably encourages early out-of-court settlements
in divorce cases.119 It is championed for these virtues. But is it living up to its billing?
The primary caretaker standard is designed to be a "bright line"
standard for child custody decision-making in order to reduce litigation and provide more predictable results. But if the primary caretaker standard is to achieve its goal of predictable custody awards, it
must eliminate judicial discretion.
But has discretion been eliminated? Carl Schneider suggests
that "even as simple a rule as the primary caretaker standard cannot
be applied mechanically, without an exercise of discretion in finding
and interpreting the facts. And that discretion can greatly affect the
ultimate decision."120 Does the judge's discretionary application of
facts using the standard lead to inconsistent results and unpredictable outcomes given similar situations? If it does, should not the
benefit of the primary caretaker standard be questioned? The standard purposefully errs on the side of determinacy versus individualized justice. Is this standard worth this cost? Perhaps only if it leads
to predictable decisions.
In contrast to the best interests of the child standard, which provides virtually unlimited discretion to decision-makers, it is argued
that the primary caretaker standard is a workable custody standard
which will properly limit the judges' ability to use their own bias,
values, and prejudices to decide the case.
But the standard has not been expressly adopted as a irrebuttable presumption, except in West Virginia. Commentators continue to
sing the benefits of the standard, but the courts and legislatures are

118. Id. at 231.
119. Neely, supra note 80, at 182.
120. Schneider, supra note 116, at 2287-88.
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not listening. Perhaps this is because the literature is void of an
analysis on how the
standard is used by judges and whether it is
" 121
indeed "workable.

121. The author has completed a dissertation which attempts to answer the
question of whether the primary caretaker standard is workable. Kathryn L. Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making-- How Judges Use the Primary
Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination (1997) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Case Western Reserve University) (on file with the Case Western
Reserve University Library).

